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Abstract
The paper identifies those elements in the configuration of fiscal parameters
confronting the country that give cause for concern, and examines whether the fiscal
reform measures taken address these adequately. The primary fiscal indicators
consolidated across Central and state governments over the last fifty years, normalised
by GDP and taken in first differences, are examined for evidence of countercyclical fiscal
policy, and election-year profligacy. The underlying structural cause of fiscal stress since
the start of reform in FY92 is then identified, as the uncompensated loss of trade tax
revenues.  This has led to a fall in the tax/GDP ratio, amounting by FY02 to two percent
of GDP relative to the all-time peak of 16 percent achieved in FY90 (there is provisional
evidence however of an upturn in FY03 by one percent). Finally, the two major fiscal
reforms initiated in FY00 are examined. One is the accounting change whereby ‘small
savings’, a supply-driven automatic borrowing channel, were re-routed into a newly
created National Small Savings Fund, independently of the budget. Although just an
accounting change, it had a profound effect in terms of signalling the need for financial
viability in the small savings scheme, and thus eroding embedded political economy
pressures in the system that served to keep up interest rates. The second major reform is
the fiscal responsibility legislation that has been enacted by the Centre, and four state
governments so far. Simulated outcomes show that without an improvement in revenue
effort, the required fiscal compression of non-interest revenue expenditure is so extreme
that it could well result in political turbulence. That could then feed back through the
election-year compulsions revealed in the regression analysis to worsening fiscal
discipline again. The paper concludes that improved revenue effort is key to fiscal reform
in India.
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Introduction
The consolidated fiscal deficit in India aggregating across all tiers
of government has in the last five years stayed in the range 9-10 percent
of GDP.
i The very large literature on the harmful growth impact of fiscal
deficits of this magnitude is not reviewed in this paper.
ii The focus
instead is on identifying which particular features of the configuration of
fiscal parameters confronting the country today are, or should be, cause
for concern, and whether the fiscal reform measures taken address
these adequately.
Worries about the sustainability of the public debt path in India
have receded somewhat in the face of the favourable growth prospects
in the current year, expected to extend into the medium-term,
iii and the
decline in nominal interest rates since FY00.  The interest rate decline
indeed, quite independently of its direct impact on debt sustainability, has
been a critical factor in the current growth buoyancy of the economy, and
is in turn an outcome of a major fiscal reform measure initiated in FY00.
Shepherding the decline through the political economy pressures
keeping up interest rates required cautious and phased progress, and is
undoubtedly one of the major successes of the fiscal reform effort.
Notwithstanding the rate decline, the interest bill on the
consolidated debt stock in FY02 and FY03 was above 6 percent of GDP,
as against tax collections of 14 percent in FY02, possibly 15 percent in
FY03 (going by budget estimates).
iv These figures, even with the tax
upturn in FY03, are unsustainable in themselves.
Clearly any understanding of the fiscal situation in India requires
identification of the drivers of fiscal imbalances in the system. Sections II
and III of the paper address this.6
Section II generates a fifty-year time series for the principal fiscal
indicators aggregating across Central and subnational state
governments, since it is this rather than the Central imbalance alone
which matters macroeconomically. The data are then tested for evidence
of countercyclical fiscal policy, and opportunistic election-year profligacy
of the kind that has been empirically demonstrated elsewhere.
v Received
empirics focus on the Centre alone, perhaps because the fiscal deficit as
internationally defined was not officially reported until FY89. Only the
monetised deficit was reported, as the uncovered residual after
subtraction from total expenditure of debt receipts along with non-debt
receipts. The fiscal deficit for years prior to FY89 had to be generated
here therefore.
In India, as in all developing countries, a distinction is made
between the overall fiscal deficit, and the excess of current expenditures
over revenue receipts (termed the ‘revenue deficit’). A high fiscal deficit
in conjunction with a low revenue deficit (or surplus), is not necessarily a
bad thing prima facie. When net new borrowing goes towards funding
capital expenditure there is, potentially at any rate, a basis for both
higher growth and higher revenues in future years. A high revenue deficit
on the other hand carries fewer possibilities of recovery (although a
contrary empirical finding in Devarajan, et. al., 1999 shows that growth in
the developing world has a positive functional dependence on non-
interest current expenditure rather than capital expenditure).
Within fiscal and revenue deficits, in turn, the imbalance of
relevance for an understanding of year-to-year variations in fiscal policy
is the corresponding primary deficit, the discretionary residual imbalance
after subtraction of interest payments from total expenditure.  Primary
deficits, revenue and fiscal, are the variables subjected to the regression
analysis of Section II.
There has been a clearly visible worsening in these primary
indicators starting with FY98. This is popularly attributed to the real wage
hike granted to civil servants on the recommendation of the Fifth Pay
Commission. The wage hike is only the immediate precipitating factor
however, and cannot be treated as an exogenous event. Section II
examines whether that, in turn, was an endogenous outcome of the
underlying political economy drivers of the system.7
Section III looks at the steady worsening in the tax/GDP ratio
over the nineties.  The all-time tax revenue peak of 16 percent of GDP
achieved in FY90 has been steadily eroded over the nineties, a result of
the uncompensated loss of trade tax revenues. Trade tax cuts have
undeniably given a long-overdue competitive edge and buoyancy to the
economy. However, in a country where trade taxes accounted pre-reform
for 3.7 percent of GDP, and 35 percent of total tax revenues at the
Centre, the issue of fiscal compensation for lost revenues was grossly
neglected. There was a vacuum in the theoretical literature on the
optimal source of replacement revenue for reduced trade taxes, with no
robust results on non-infinitesimal changes until a recent contribution by
Keen and Ligthart, 2001. The price-neutral VAT suggested there as a
welfare-enhancing source of compensation, however carries a political
feasibility problem. An IMF empirical cross-country study does not
encourage confidence in its revenue-enhancing properties in the
developing world.
Thus, the fiscal stress in India today, as in all developing
countries undergoing a process of trade tax reform, is a result of both
theoretical and practical neglect of the revenue loss from falling trade
taxes. Lost trade tariff revenues in India have resulted in an
uncompensated loss in aggregate tax revenue, which had amounted to
two percentage points of GDP by FY02.
vi This is a disastrous decline in a
developing country critically in need of growth-promoting public goods.
Sections IV and V examine two major official moves towards
reform of the fiscal situation, against the background of the analysis of
the earlier sections. Section IV examines the fiscal responsibility
legislation initiated in FY00 and recently enacted by the Central
government, and four state governments. The simulations of the fiscal
correction projected in the legislation in Section IV show compression of
non-interest current expenditure to a fairly extreme degree, which can be
relieved only if there is a substantial improvement in revenue
performance, over historically achieved rates of increase.
Section V examines the engineered reduction in nominal interest
rates already referred to, starting with the accounting change in FY00
whereby ‘small savings’ were nested in a newly created National Small
Savings Fund, independently of the budget. Although just an accounting
change, it had a profound effect in terms of eroding embedded political
economy pressures keeping up interest rates.8
Section VI concludes.
II.  Diagnostics: Fiscal Indicators 1951-2001
The principal fiscal indicators for the fifty years 1951-2001,
consolidated across national (Central) and subnational (state)
governments, are examined in this section for evidence of
countercyclical properties, and opportunistic behaviour by governments
confronting elections.
Official reporting in India of the fiscal deficit as internationally
defined started only in FY89. Perhaps for this reason, there are only two
formal econometric studies of fiscal deficits in India going back beyond
the nineties, both confined to the Centre (Sen and Vaidya, 1996 and
Cashin, et. al., 2001).
vii
The data series for years prior to FY89 has been generated here
therefore, and was terminated by data availability at FY01.
viii The
accounting discontinuity starting FY00 with the re-routing of small
savings makes the Central fiscal deficit non-comparable across that
year,
ix but does not affect the consolidated fiscal deficit.
Chart 1 shows the fifty-year series for the primary revenue deficit
and primary overall fiscal deficit, both as percentages of GDP, which
define the discretionary component of the deficit after deducting interest
on the public debt accumulated from past fiscal deficits. The difference
between the two, in the absence of disinvestment receipts on the capital
account (which by official figures only began in FY92)
x yields the
percentage of publicly-funded capital expenditure to GDP.
The figures exclude the third tier, local government. Local
government is not empowered to run budgetary deficits, but urban
corporations can borrow on a project-specific basis.
xi Starting 1998, there
are municipal bond flotations by urban corporations, aggregating to the
comparatively trivial sum of 600 crore (Mathur, 2003).  These are not
added on here, because they are akin to borrowing by other parastatals.
Parastatal debt does not add to the explicit budgetary deficit but often9
carries a Central or state government guarantee. The issue of
guarantees will be addressed in section IV of the paper


























































































































Notes: 1.   Primary deficits are obtained after subtracting interest payments from the
reported consolidated figure across Centre and states, which nets out inter-governmental
flows. All reported capital expenditure figures are net of loan recoveries, and net out loan
repayments.
            2.     Negative values indicate primary surpluses.
Source: The fiscal deficit (FD) starting FY89 is the reported figure in Government of India,
2003b, assorted issues. For earlier years, obtained from the difference between
expenditure and non-debt current receipts from the same source, or where unavailable, as
for the fifties, from Rangamannar, 2002. The change starting FY00 in the role of the Central
government as on-lender of small savings to states (see section V) does not affect the
consolidated figure.
The following stylisations of the Indian fiscal stance over the fifty-
year period emerge quite clearly from chart I:
• The primary revenue balance was in surplus until FY98.  It is only
starting FY99 that there has actually been a primary revenue deficit,
never exceeding 1 percent of GDP.
• The primary fiscal balance has been consistently in deficit all
through, but in conjunction with the primary revenue surplus, has10
clearly gone towards funding of capital expenditure, and thus
towards the accumulation of public assets. The efficiency or
revenue-yielding properties of that capital expenditure are another
matter altogether.
• The primary fiscal deficit (PFD) reached an all-time peak of 7 percent
of GDP in FY87. The downward adjustment of the PFD by 6
percentage points of GDP over the ten years 1987-97 against a
roughly constant primary revenue surplus (negative PRD) of around
1 percent of GDP implies a corresponding reduction in public capital
expenditure. Independently of the quality of the capital expenditure in
previous years, fiscal correction through reduction of capital
expenditure robs it of growth-promoting properties. After 1997, the
PFD has risen again to its present level of around 3.5 percent of
GDP.
• Starting FY98, both fiscal and revenue balances have worsened in
tandem.


























































































































GFD/GDP RD/GDP Int rate
Notes and Source:  See notes and source to chart 1. The interest rate for year t is the
average nominal rate, calculated from interest payments in year t on the closing debt stock
in year (t-1).11
Chart 2 shows the fiscal and revenue deficits, along with the
nominal interest rate (the average paid on the closing stock of the
previous financial year of public debt, external plus internal, including
monetised liabilities held by the RBI). This average rate, which is a
lagged indicator of the marginal rate on fresh liabilities, shows a steady
rise from the eighties after a long period of stagnation at 4 percent, finally
peaking in FY00. Clearly, it is the interest bill that drove the emergence
of a consolidated revenue deficit in 1983, and its steady rise thereafter,
at a time when the primary revenue balance was still in surplus.
There are thus two basic components to the fiscal deficit story.
There is the interest rate increase, its steady rise until FY00, and the
institutional underpinnings of this increase. The immediate prospects are
that the average rate on public debt will decline further, although with a
pick-up in private investment further down the road, the future interest
rate path is difficult to predict with any certainty.
The second component of the fiscal story are the worsening
starting FY98 of the primary indicators, both revenue and overall. The
expenditure side provocation for this was the implementation of the real
wage increase recommended by the Fifth Pay Commission for Central
government employees and pensioners starting FY98. The staff
downsizing which was a part of the recommended package, was not
formally accepted. The wage hike was subsequently implemented by all
state governments on parity considerations. Some states like Punjab
enthusiastically implemented real wage increases exceeding those at the
Centre. Chart 3 shows the impact of this.  The consolidated wage-salary-
pension bill as a percent of GDP rose from around 5.5 percent of GDP,
to 7 percent by FY00.
The Pay Commission real wage hike was clearly endogenous to
the political economy forces at work in the system.  Before going to the
regression exercises that investigate those forces, it has to be noted that
India does not have an exceptionally large civil service by international
standards. A widely quoted comparative study shows the number of civil
servants per 100 population to be 1.2 in India, well below 2.8 in China
(an equivalently large country), and clearly much lower than smaller
countries because of an understandable scale effect (Schiavo-Campo,
1998). The problem in India lies not so much in the overall size of the
civil service, as in the composition of government staff, with the top two
(Groups A, B) of a four-group system accounting for 5 percent of the total12
number, and Group C for 70 percent (Beschel, 2003). Sub-clerical staff
(Group D) whose principal purpose is to serve the other government staff
account for 25 percent of the total, and are the source of the visible
idleness at government offices. Group D jobs with no particular skill
requirement enable political patronage, and the high wage relative to per
capita GDP keeps up the value of that patronage.

























Notes: 1. Compensation of employees includes pensions and wages and salaries,
consolidated across Centre and states.
2.   The GDP figure for FY01 is provisional.
Source:   Compensation of employees from National Accounts Statistics, assorted issues;
GDP from Economic Survey 2002-03.
Detailed manuals on how to downsize government are provided
by Sundaram and Beschel, 2003, and Saxena, 2003, for (presumably)
unchanged delivery levels. However, casual evidence from such
downsizing as has occurred in banks and other public sector
undertakings suggests that service delivery declines as a result. The
staff who leave tend to be skilled personnel with market value. None of
these studies quantifies the expenditure reduction possible from any one,
or the totality, of the downsizing measures suggested. Without that, it is13
not possible to quantify the potential contribution to fiscal correction from
government staff restructuring.
The only econometric studies for India investigating fiscal
imbalances over the long haul are confined to the Central government,
but are invaluable nevertheless. Cashin et al, 2001, establish the
presence of tax-smoothing through a VAR approach for the period 1951-
97. Tax smoothing, as the term suggests, will leave the tax burden
unadjusted to temporary shocks in expenditure, though not to permanent
increases. This result is plausible and very useful as far as it goes, but
the underlying model treats government expenditure (net of interest) as
exogenously given.
xii Clearly, there is a need to build on this further so as
to understand what drives temporary expenditure shocks. Further, by
investigating fiscal behaviour in terms of imbalances rather than
expenditure, the tax response gets factored in, and informs policy reform
more comprehensively.
The precursor to the test conducted here for pre-election fiscal
behaviour, in the tradition of the literature on political business cycles
(summarised in Alesina et al, 1997), is the study by Sen and Vaidya,
1996. Building on an earlier study confined to government expenditure
by Karnik, 1990, Sen and Vaidya examine Central government
imbalances (the revenue deficit, inclusive of interest payments) and find
a statistically significant increase in pre-election years over the period
1951-89. Interestingly, they find no electoral response in either
expenditure or revenue taken independently, thus suggesting the use of
both in conjunction and contradicting therefore the tax smoothing result
of Cashin et al., 2001.
The exercise performed here was deliberately confined to fiscal
outcomes consolidated across all levels of government over the fifty-year
period 1951-2001, since it is the aggregate fiscal deficit rather than the
Central deficit alone which matters macroeconomically. State-level
borrowing requires Central permission,
xiii except for the automatic
entitlement to small savings collections within the jurisdiction of each
state (see section V for details). The interest rate levers determining the
total quantum of small saving inflows in aggregate, were entirely
administratively set by the Central government until FY99. Starting FY00,
rates on small savings were benchmarked to an assortment of
instrument-specific rates, but in the absence of any public commitment to
the margin in terms of either magnitude or sign, the final rates remained14
administered rather than market-driven. A more formal commitment was
made starting FY03 to both the instrument-specific benchmark/s, and the
cap on margins of +50 basis points, as recommended by an official
committee. Within that cap, the margin is still under Central control, and
the Centre continues to offer tax incentives for these instruments. Thus,
the Centre still carries downside flexibility with respect to rates on small
savings to a considerable degree.
For the period studied here, the consolidated deficit can be said
to have remained entirely subject to Central control. This explains the
finding in Khemani, 2004, for elections at state government level in India,
that state election years see no rise in borrowing, but do see a re-
allocation of taxes and expenditures in favour of special interest groups.
There was state government pressure on the Centre to keep up interest
rates on small savings, but the decision as to whether to accede to these
pressures or not rested ultimately with the Centre.
xiv The consolidated
revenue deficit also remained under Central control, through Central
determination of aggregate grants for current expenditures under Plan
schemes. These grants may be formulaic in terms of their distribution
between states (Rajaraman, 2003c), but the aggregate is Centrally
specified.
The dependent variable of all the regressions reported in table 1
is the primary consolidated deficit, both revenue and overall fiscal,
normalised by GDP, and taken in first differences. The dependent
variable is so specified that if the buoyancies of revenue, and
expenditure net of interest, with respect to GDP are both one, it will have
a value of zero.  The specifications test for whether consolidated fiscal
outcomes carried a countercyclical stabilisation component, with
intercept dummies for election years.
The election year dummy is for general elections, when voting
takes place to the national Parliament. Concurrence with state elections
broke down after about 1971. The purpose is to test for whether
opportunistic behaviour prior to a general election is a statistically
significant driver of the consolidated fiscal imbalance. The specification
posits an election year dummy invariant with respect to the party in
power. Dummy 1 is confined to elections after 1971, prior to which there
was no effective national opposition capable of voting out the party in
power, and therefore no incentive for fiscal profligacy in an election year.
Dummy 2 is for all elections over the fifty years barring the first in 1951.15
The election dummies were assigned a value of one for the fiscal year
immediately preceding an election, anticipated either because the
government had reached the last year of its five-year term (recent
examples are FY90 and FY96), or because the government expected to
be voted out of power in the course of the year (as for example FY80,
FY91, FY98; see notes to table 1 for details).
xv
Table 1: Countercyclical and Electoral Underpinnings of Fiscal Indicators 1951-2001
(Consolidated Centre + States)
General election
intercept




























































































Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are t-values. Asterisks mark levels of statistical significance,
three for P < 0.01.  All D-W values fell in the range 1.81-2.01.
2. Dependent variables are taken in first differences (t-(t-1)). GDP growth rates are from the
factor cost aggregate; GDP and agriculture sector figures for FY01 are provisional, subject to
revision.
Source: See source to chart 1 for fiscal indicators, and also notes to chart 1. GDP data from
GOI, Economic Survey 2002-03. Election years from Butler et.al., 1991 supplemented for
recent years from GOI 2002a.
GDP growth rates are taken both concurrently and lagged one
year, both overall, and confined to agriculture. The sectoral focus on
agriculture is because of the exogenous rainfall factor, which in failed
years calls forth a fiscal relief response in the form of rural employment
and other welfare schemes. The two special cases were the elections in
October 1984 and September 1999. The corresponding dummy value of16
one was assigned to FY85 (even though the precipitating event was
unforeseen, it was the last year of a five-year term); and to FY99 (since
the government was voted out at the conclusion of that fiscal year, with
caretaker status until the mid-year election in FY00).
The intercept coefficients for election years are positive and
highly significant statistically in all the specifications. Dummy 1 is the
more significant for each pair of alternatives, confined to elections after
1971 when the electoral outcome became more uncertain for the
government in power. These run contrary to the findings in Alesina, et al,
1997, where the election-year cycle in the OECD world is revealed to be
driven more by partisan party ideology than by pure opportunism,
The coefficients for the concurrent growth rate are not significant
for any specification.  These capture the composite effect of the
structural properties of the fiscal system, which in India carry a peculiar
feature that could impart an upward bias to the concurrent growth
coefficient. Small savings collections, which are supply-driven, would
carry buoyancy with respect to the growth rate, but are of course only
one component of government borrowing. Unless government borrowing
through other instruments is adjusted in response to the small savings
inflows in the course of the year, there could be a positive concurrent
growth impact on net government borrowing. This could counter the
policy response, if any, and yield a statistically insignificant coefficient.
The coefficients for growth lagged one year do however carry the
policy response, and these are indeed negative and statistically
significant coefficients (with the exception of PFD/ GDP with dummy 2).
In general, the coefficients for agriculture carry greater significance than
for overall growth, and in absolute value are higher.
Thus, the year-to-year variations in the fiscal stance over the
period 1951-01 are systematically underpinned by two factors. There is
the election year response, which has become more marked in the last
thirty years, with an upward spike measured in first differences of 0.7
percent of GDP in the primary revenue deficit, and 0.8 - 0.9 percent of
GDP in the primary fiscal deficit. There is also a countercyclical policy
response, of the order of (-)0.04 percent of GDP for every 1 percent of
agricultural growth lagged by one year, and of (-)0.06 - (-)0.08 percent
for every 1 percent in overall growth, also lagged by one year. There is17
no response to variations in the concurrent growth rate, either overall, or
agricultural.
Against the background of these results, the enactment of fiscal
responsibility legislation by the Central government and four states so
far, have to be examined for their effectiveness in providing a bulwark
against election year profligacy. Simulations of outcomes under these
new enactments are performed in section IV.
Prior to that, there is a need to look at the revenue underpinnings
of the fiscal stress in the post-reform period. This is done in Section III of
the paper. The interest rate issue will be explored in Section V.
III.  Prescription Failure: Fiscal Compensation
for Lost Trade Tax Revenue
The trade tariff reform initiated in India in 1991 was overdue and
has had a clear impact on efficiency and competition. But it has resulted
in an uncompensated loss in aggregate tax revenue of two percentage
points of GDP by latest actuals for FY02.
xvi Clearly, trade liberalisation
need not necessarily reduce revenues, especially if the starting point is
highly protective, as indeed the Indian case was, as a result of
tariffication of non-tariff barriers in the eighties.
xvii  The point at issue here
is that for any developing country undergoing trade reform, there is a
need to examine the revenue implications ex ante.
Since trade taxes are levied exclusively at national level, there
has been a corresponding decline in the share of tax collections at the
Centre relative to the states.  The issue of whether this matters for the
balance of power between Centre and states in the Indian fiscal
federation is explored in Rajaraman, 2003c.
Formal theoretical investigations of the joint welfare outcome of
tariff reductions with revenue compensation have been sparse, either
because of the assumed availability of the lumpsum tax alternative, or
because an equivalently welfare-neutral alternative was seen in a
destination-based tax on consumption (Dixit, 1985). The first result
showing welfare improvement from a radial reduction of tariffs with a18
radial expansion of consumption taxes was confined to the infinitesimal
case (Hatzipanayotou, Michael and Miller, 1994).  A later study for the
non-infinitesimal case by Anderson, 1999 found the joint outcome not
unambiguously welfare-improving.
A robust result for the non-infinitesimal case is fairly recent
(Keen and Ligthart, 2001). This establishes that any tariff cut, radial or
otherwise, with a simultaneous price-neutral non-cascading consumption
tax (a VAT) will enhance both welfare and net revenue. Unlike earlier
studies, this finding relates to cuts rather than total elimination of tariffs.
Thus the Keen-Ligthart finding establishes, for the first time, the
theoretical underpinning for a trade-fiscal policy package that
compensates tariff cuts with a price-neutral domestic destination-based
VAT on consumption.
There are three problems with the Keen-Ligthart prescription.
The first is that VATs compensating for trade tariff reform do not in
general target price neutrality. The second is that international evidence
does not show revenue enhancement from introduction of a VAT in low-
income countries (Ebrill et al, 2001). The third is that in most federal
countries, national governments collect far lower shares in domestic
indirect taxes than in income taxes, to which they enjoy dominant or
exclusive rights. Even if revenue replacement is possible through a VAT,
the additional revenue would in a federal country like India accrue at the
level of states. This will further reduce the Central share in aggregate tax
collections. Even a dual VAT will not restore the pre-reform Central
share. This might actually be protested not so much at Central level as at
subnational level, if taxes shared by the national government are
redistributive in character, which is indeed the case in India (Rajaraman,
2003c).
Table 2 sets out tax/GDP ratios at national and subnational
levels of government in India since the all-time peak of 15.98 percent
achieved in FY90. Overall, there was a fall in the tax/GDP ratio from
15.98 percent in FY90 to 13.81 percent in FY02, by 2.17 percentage
points (the figures for FY02 include pre-actuals for states, subject to
revision). This is a little more than the loss in customs revenue, which
therefore remains uncompensated. The table also shows the revenue
loss and compensation figures for all years after FY90, relative to the
base year.
xviii19
Table 2: Actual and Compensated Fiscal Deficits (Centre + States): FY90 to FY01



















FY90 15.98 3.71 8.74 8.74 4.52 4.52 -1.04 -1.04
Change over FY90
FY91 -0.55 -0.08 0.57 0.02 0.39 -0.16 0.81 0.26
FY92 -0.18 -0.30 -1.80 -1.98 -2.32 -2.50 -0.35 -0.53
FY93 -0.72 -0.53 -1.96 -2.68 -2.53 -3.25 -0.59 -1.31
FY94 -1.79 -1.13 -0.61 -2.40 -1.35 -3.14 0.30 -1.49
FY95 -1.38 -1.06 -1.82 -3.20 -2.73 -4.11 -0.47 -1.85
FY96 -1.23 -0.70 -2.22 -3.45 -2.96 -4.19 -0.68 -1.91
FY97 -1.36 -0.58 -2.48 -3.84 -3.38 -4.74 -0.51 -1.87
FY98 -1.49 -1.07 -1.58 -3.07 -2.52 -4.01 0.03 -1.46
FY99 -2.60 -1.37 0.21 -2.39 -0.89 -3.49 2.08 -0.52
FY00 -1.80 -1.21 0.73 -1.07 -0.74 -2.54 1.63 -0.17
FY01 -1.47 -1.45 0.40 -1.06 -1.06 -2.53 1.79 0.32
FY02 *-2.17 -1.96 *1.17 *-1.00 -0.73 -2.90 1.80 -0.37
Percent to GDP
FY01 14.51 2.26 9.14 7.67 3.46 1.99 0.75 -0.72
FY02 *13.81 1.75 *9.91 *7.74 *3.79 *1.62 *0.76 *-1.41
Notes: *All figures for FY02 include pre-actuals (RE) for some states.  The consolidated fiscal
deficit figures for FY02 are approximations constructed from the most updated estimates
available. The official figure will be reported only after audited actuals are in for all state
governments. Negative figures for deficits indicated surpluses.
Source: Public Finance Statistics 2002-03, supplemented by Central Finance Accounts for
2001-02.
The table also shows what the overall fiscal, primary fiscal and
primary revenue deficits would have been had the fall in total revenue
been fully compensated. The compensated primary revenue balance is
in surplus all through with a higher surplus in FY02 relative to FY90, the
compensated primary fiscal deficit is well under 0.5 percent in four years
of the period, and the compensated overall fiscal deficit is one
percentage point lower in FY02 than in FY90.
Customs revenue was a prominent contributor to revenues, at
3.7 percent of GDP prior to trade tariff reform, 35 percent of total tax
revenues at the Centre. No one can argue that the infamously high tariff
rates of that time should have been retained for revenue purposes.  But
neglect the need for compensating revenues led to avoidable fiscal
stress, and was a serious failing of the reform programme.20
The theoretically prescribed source of compensating revenue is
a price-neutral VAT. The VAT is shown in an IMF estimate of revenue
outcomes for 183 countries, of which 99 had a VAT (Ebrill et.al., 2001),
to have a positive impact on overall (including non-tax) government
revenue as a percent of GDP only interactively with per capita income.
xix
There is a significant negative coefficient to an interactive VAT dummy
with the importance of trade, showing a revenue loss with a VAT that
varies directly with the importance of international trade. The latter is an
empirical finding of particular relevance in light of the recommendation in
the fiscal compensation literature that trade tariff revenues can be fully or
more than fully compensated by a VAT.
When the cross-sectional exercise is performed with tax revenue
alone, instead of overall including non-tax revenue, the VAT intercept is
negative, and almost significant at 10 percent. The coefficient of the
interaction term for VAT with per capita income continues to be positive
and significant, thus implying that the impact of VAT is negative only for
poorer countries. Finally, when the dependent variable is tax revenue of
national-level government alone, there is no evidence of any impact,
positive or negative, of introduction of a VAT. This is further empirical
validation of the impact of fiscal compensation through a VAT on the
balance of power in a fiscal federation.
A recent exercise for India (Rao, 2003) estimates the revenue
impact of a 12.5 percent destination-based state-level VAT on
manufactured goods, with 4 percent on inputs. A revenue increase
between 5 to 10 percent is estimated to be possible only if the value
addition margin beyond manufacturing is 20 percent of manufacturing
value (a reasonable assumption). A critical and less reasonable
assumption is zero loss from evasion and fraud.  However, some states
lose revenue from elimination of the Central Sales Tax (CST) levied at
the state of origin on inter-state sales, akin to an export tax between
countries.
xx Revenue-losing states look to the Centre for compensation,
thus increasing further the burden on the Centre on account of the very
levy that is supposed to compensate for lost trade taxes.
But the final issue does not hinge on the revenue outcomes of
VATs in practice. The issue is that, given the criticality of public goods
from the very perspectives of efficiency and growth that drive trade tariff
reductions, the need for fiscal compensation has been astonishingly
neglected. The theoretical recommendation of welfare-improving21
compensation through a price-neutral domestic VAT is infeasible in
practice, aside from unchanged consumer prices negating a large part of
the gains from trade liberalisation, and negating also the domestic
political support for trade reform.
The present state of play in respect of the state-level VAT is that
one state has actually introduced it, and several others are at varying
stages of readiness. Even if the state-level VAT proves to be revenue-
enhancing in aggregate, it will not replace revenue at the level of
government where revenues have been lost. This has important
implications for the balance of power between the two levels of
government, and between regions in the country. The pressures
generated will be a function of whether fiscal transfers from the Centre to
states are formulaic or discretionary, and of the redistributive component
of the formulae used for Centre-state transfers (explored in Rajaraman,
2003c). Possible political turbulence as a result of these pressures and
frequent elections could lead to further fiscal strain, as the regression
results of the last section suggest.
There are two sources of structural difficulty in finding
compensating revenue in India.  One is the large sectoral share in GDP
of the two classically hard-to-tax sectors, services (except for the public
and formal private establishments) and agriculture (except for
plantations). Agriculture accounts for a quarter of GDP. Services account
for half of GDP, and have over the past decade recorded the highest and
most stable rates of growth. The hard-to-tax segments of services are
those where there is a prevalence of cash transactions, like construction,
road transportation and trade. These add up to 30 percent of GDP.
xxi
Some of the newer services in the new economy (event management,
fashion design) are not effectively taxed, although some others like call
centres should prove to be more tractable.
Indirect taxation of services faces a well-known assignment
vacuum in the Constitution. The Centre stepped into this vacuum by
enacting a Service Tax Act in 1994, under which it collects indirect taxes
on a list of services that has now grown to 58 in number, using residuary
powers under the Constitution. There now exists provision for
withholding (provisional, not final) of these at source. Upto FY02, the
service tax compensated by 0.14 percent of GDP for the loss in revenue
from trade tariffs, an additionality that has accrued at Central level.22
The issue is whether services should continue to be taxed at the
Centre, so as to stem the decline in the Centre’s share in total revenues,
or whether some or all of these services should be transferred to states
as part of a full-blown destination-based VAT. The efficiency argument
favours such a transfer, but because of the redistributive properties of
Central transfers to states, resistance to the transfer might paradoxically
emanate at state-level. Two government reports (GOI, 2001a and 2002b)
examine the issue of how the Central tax on services can be integrated
with the Central CENVAT on manufacturing, which presently extends
input credits only on goods, and the very difficult issue of whether service
taxation should be split between, or concurrently shared by, Centre and
states. There is now a ninety-fifth Constitutional amendment, whereby
services falling in the Central domain can be assigned for revenue
collection and retention by state of origin. This muddies the waters
further, as such levies, being Central levies, may not be rebatable
against the state-level VAT (Bagchi, 2003), nor possibly against the
CENVAT.
Agriculture is the other undertaxed sector, which is presently
outside the domain of the Central income tax, and assigned to the fiscal
domain of the states. The argument against unifying the income tax and
making it a global rather than a schedular tax, is that the reasons for the
revenue-insignificance of agricultural taxation at state-level will only gain
force at Central level. It has been argued at length elsewhere
(Rajaraman, 2003b), that only rural local government will be able to tax
agriculture effectively. A land-based crop-specific levy at the local level is
feasible, is in accordance with widely-accepted principles of assignment
of taxes by domain, and will lead to revenue additionality in the system
taken as a whole. These revenues will accrue jurisdictionally at the local
level, and provide much needed resources for critically under-provided
local public goods like sanitation and local road connectivity. The
redistribution objective between local governments can always be
attained through independent and transparent state government grants,
so structured as not to rob the local level of incentives to collect the tax.
The formula itself can be left to the discretion of state governments.
The burden of taxation is disproportionately borne therefore by
the taxable sub-sector of services, and manufacturing, the residual
quarter of GDP. Tax reform in India calls very urgently for the restoration
of cross-sectoral parity to the tax structure. The second structural23
difficulty is the need for a good information base shared across levels of
government, which is essential in a large fiscal federation.
Official reports (Government of India, 2002b), make a number of
suggestions for widening the revenue base, and reducing evasion. There
is a detailed book-length treatments of the administrative improvements
that can be brought about in the income-tax department (Das-Gupta and
Mookherjee, 1998). Possibly the failure to institute revenue-productive
reforms in tax administration has more to do with political economy
factors of the kind probed in Karnik, 1999.  Or perhaps the fiscal stress in
India today would not have resulted had revenue compensation for
losses from reduced trade taxes been added as conditionalities to trade
reform.
IV.  Fiscal Responsibility Legislation
Table 3 shows the principal features of fiscal responsibility
legislation enacted by the  Governments of Karnataka, Kerala, Punjab
and Tamil Nadu. India has not followed the coordinated approach of
subordinating all subnational governments to uniform rules, as
recommended by Kopits, 2001.
xxii There is also a Central Act, the design
of which is shown separately in box 1.  Unlike the State Acts, the Central
Act carries only one quantified target for the revenue deficit. Other
targets and paths are left to the Rules that will accompany the legislation,
and which can thereby be altered without amending the Act. No
simulations are performed for the Central Act therefore.
In what follows the design of enacted legislation (not extending
to Bills under consideration, as in Maharashtra) will be examined against
the background of the underpinnings of the fiscal problem as revealed in
sections II and III. Finally, the fiscal compression implicit in the targets, is
obtained through simulation.
There are five design features to these Acts.
First, the quantified limits to revenue and overall fiscal
imbalances are in general specified for a stated target year, either FY06
or FY07. Punjab has annual path limits, but these have to be exceeded if24
the debt target is to be met (see table 4). An amendment to the Tamil
Nadu act has introduced annual path limits to the revenue deficit.
Second, there are no stated penalties for failure. Where there
are no annual path limits, a government facing elections midway to the
target destination has no incentive whatever to move towards the target.
There are the documentary obligations on fiscal intentions, with a
typically 3–4 year horizon, but these carry no commitments independent
of legislated limits. For a government with a comfortable majority,
deviation from the tabled Medium Term Fiscal Programme will not mean
a vote out of power.  For a wobbly government, even adherence to the
programme could bring political challenge in terms of the manner in
which fiscal correction is achieved. Only one (Karnataka) carries explicit
protection for social sector expenditure against compression.
Third, the correction of the revenue deficit is sharper than
correction of the fiscal deficit, which permits high rates of increase in
capital expenditure, as the simulations will show, but requires a sharp
reduction in (non-interest) revenue expenditure.
Box 1: Design Features of the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act of the
Central Government
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Notes:     Rules*: To be specified
Source:   The Gazette of India, Tuesday, 26 August 2003.25
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Total debt £ 25% GSDP
31 March 2015
None 40%  GSDP
31 March 2007
-
Protection Exp. on elem. edu.,
basic health, rural water
supply
- No fiscal sops six months
before elections
-
Ambiguities            1.   Revenue receipts from the Centre
 2.   Estimated GSDP (time-lag)
3.   Non-compliance penalties26
Notes:   The Macro-economic: Framework statement is to provide an assessment of growth
in GDP, the fiscal balance and external balance of payments. The MTFP is a Medium Term
Fiscal Programme with a rolling time horizon as specified; FPSS is a Fiscal Policy Strategy
Statement; RR is total revenue receipts
Source:  The Karnataka Fiscal Responsibility Bill, 2002, No. 28; Kerala Fiscal
Responsibility Act, 2003, No.29; Punjab Government Gazette, Monday, 5 May 2003; Tamil
Nadu Fiscal Responsibility Act, 2003 as amended on 10 February 2004.
Fourth, the single most effective feature is the inflexible limit
xxiii
on government guarantees to parastatal debt (all except Kerala). The
stock of unweighted guaranteed debt aggregated across states is 27
percent of the aggregate explicit debt stock (RBI, 2003). At end-March
2000, the figures for individual states (Thorat and Roy, 2004), were 43.5
percent in Karnataka, 32 percent in Punjab, and 25.6 percent in Tamil
Nadu (Kerala was relatively low at 20 percent). The specification of limits
on guarantees with reference to revenue receipts is also a good design
feature. As can be seen in box 1, the Central Act assigns even this limit
to Rules, which can be changed without amending legislation.
Fifth and finally, none carries any revenue performance targets.
As the simulation results will show, the failure to specify these is an
important deficiency. At state level, there is the added need to distinguish
between own revenue effort, and revenues received as tax shares from
the Centre.
Table 4 shows the simulation results for the fiscal compression
implicit in the legislation at state-level. Because the fiscal Rules
underlying the Central Act are yet to be specified, no simulations were
performed for the Central government. The correction process is started
in FY03,
xxiv and is terminated in the stated target year for Karnataka,
Kerala and Tamil Nadu.
There are two sets of simulations, one with projections for total
revenue (own plus received from Centre) at the achieved buoyancies in
the five-year period 1997-02, all well below one, and one with projected
buoyancies set at one.
xxv Two values for the average nominal interest
rate on state debt are used: 11.5 (except for Kerala) and 10.5 percent
(the latter in view of falling nominal interest rates and Central efforts to
reduce the interest bill of states by introducing debt swaps; see also
section V).  Nominal GSDP growth at the same rate as in 1997-02
underlies all the simulations. In Punjab, the constraint on the permissible27
growth in the debt stock was used to simulate limits on the fiscal
imbalance, with the revenue deficit simulated at the path limits.




Karnataka Kerala Punjab Tamil
Nadu
Nom. GSDP(fc) 11.57 11.71 11.12 11.88 Annual
growth
Total revenue receipts 9.75 8.06 9.90 9.49
Own revenue/total
revenue
73.16 72.40 74.70 83.99 Average
Interest/debt (%)
(FY02) 12.11 10.41 11.42 12.25
Capital expenditure 13.60 -5.91 11.38 8.32 Annual
growth
Non-interest rev. exp. 12.10 10.04 17.71 9.26
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1. Nominal GSDP is projected to grow at the same rate as in the five-year period 1997-
02. The GSDP figure for FY02 is a quick estimate, subject to revision. The first
correction year is assumed to be FY03 for all states.
2. The Punjab projections are based on the debt target of 40 percent of GSDP for FY07,
since the path limits on FD led to a debt stock at 46 percent of GSDP in the target year.
The RD was assumed to grow at the path limits. The eventual FD and RD targets (see
table 3) are reached in FY08 and FY11 respectively. The lower end of the path limit
range in the amended TN Act led to a revenue surplus in the target year.
3. The Punjab figures for growth in capital and non-interest revenue expenditure are for
the period 1996-01, since an unusually low capital expenditure in FY97 gave very high
rates of subsequent increase when used as the base year.28
4. Since the interest rate on Kerala debt going in was only 10.41 percent, no simulations
were performed at 11.5 percent.
Source:  State-wise data from RBI State Finances, supplemented by actuals for FY02 from
the Ministry of Finance.  Simulations based on targets in table 3.
The two outcome indicators are the permissible annual rates of
increase in capital expenditure, which falls out of the difference between
the revenue and fiscal imbalance targets, and non-interest revenue
expenditure. In all four states capital expenditure shows impressively
high annual rates of increase. However, the curtailment of non-interest
revenue expenditure, with revenue growing at historical buoyancies can
be seen to be very sharp – down to annual rates of increase between 0-5
percent. Quite aside from the feasibility of such sharp cuts, there is the
issue of how these will be achieved.  If staff prove to be more resistant to
cuts than maintenance and other expenditure, there could be a very
steep decline in the quality of government service, and infrastructure.
Some infrastructure might simply become inoperable without adequate
maintenance.
Non-interest revenue expenditure goes up by under one percent
for a one percent drop in the average interest rate. But it rises by well
over one percent in response to an increase in buoyancy of total (own
plus received) revenue to one, from achieved buoyancies in the five
years immediately preceding ranging between 0.7 to 0.9.
In summary, the simulations show that without added revenue
effort, the fiscal compression imposed by the fiscal responsibility
legislation will be crippling. The table also shows the dependence of the
four states on own revenues. In all cases, own revenues constitute the
dominant component of total revenues, and this percentage has
remained stable over time (improving slightly over the last twenty years).
Thus, all four states have the wherewithal to make the legislation work,
without undue damage to the quality of public service delivery.  But that
outcome critically depends on own revenue effort. Without that, there
could be a downward spiral into political turbulence, and further fiscal
stress following from short-lived governments and frequent elections.
The absence of path limits is a serious deficiency. The only
possibly positive aspect of this is that this leaves room for
accommodation to countercyclical fiscal policy, a needed feature in light
of the regression results of section II. But this flexibility could easily have
been built in with either margins to path limits, or cumulation of path29
limits across a possible maximum of three consecutive years. As the
legislation presently stands, it does not protect against election-year
opportunism. Only the Punjab Act carries a specific ban on fiscal sops
six months before elections.
V.  Interest Rates on Public Debt
This is the final piece of the fiscal story in India, supplementing
the analysis in Section II of primary deficits. State government
borrowings are subject to Central government approval as in all
federations, for reasons of macroeconomic discipline,
xxvi with the
exception of the automatic entitlement upto a fixed percentage, now 100
percent, of small savings collected from the public within the jurisdiction
of each state against instruments like Post Office Savings Certificates.
xxvii
Until FY00, these were routed through the Central Budget, where all
deposits were collected and on-lent to states against jurisdictional
collections. This provided an immediate incentive to state governments
to work towards raising small savings collections within their states. But it
also generated pressure by state governments on the Central
government, which administered the deposit rates on these schemes, to
widen the gap in post-tax returns between small savings and other
instruments.
Rates on loans charged by the Centre also rose correspondingly.
This is what basically drove the rise in interest rates on consolidated
public debt shown in chart 2, and exerted upward pressure on the
interest rate structure in the country after an earlier period of financial
suppression. State governments continue to carry the burden of interest
rates on loans taken when rates were as high as 14.5 percent.
xxviii In
FY02, interest payments by states in aggregate stood at 42 percent of
their own revenue collections.
xxix
A first move towards unraveling this clearly untenable situation
was begun in FY00. All accounting flows in respect of small savings after
1 April 1999 were moved to a National Small Savings Fund in the Public
Account.
xxx For the very first time, this enabled a clear picture of the
financial viability of the scheme, which was rendered utterly opaque by
the accounting separations previously in place.30
With the exposure of the necessary link between the lending and
deposit rates of the scheme, the political economy pressure to keep up
deposit rates on small savings subsided.  Subsequent to this accounting
reform in FY00, it became possible to bring down deposit and lending
rates in several stages. This accounting reform was a major fiscal
achievement of the last five years, removing as it did, the endogenous
upward pressures on interest rates and fiscal deficits, with cripplingly
adverse growth consequences.
Deposit rates on small savings are still administered, but the
rates are now benchmarked to the Bank Rate, with the margin capped at
+50 basis points. Because these are zero-risk instruments, many still
carrying tax incentives, these rates continue to function as a floor to the
interest rate structure in the economy. With its control over the margin,
and the tax incentives given, the Central government is in control of the
aggregate flows into the scheme. But the unevenness of the accretion
across states acts as an enabler of fiscal indiscipline at state level.
If the primary revenue deficit is taken as the core indicator of
inability to match current revenues to current expenditures, and as the
floor (barring exceptional non-debt receipts on the capital account) to the
primary fiscal deficit, there were as many as seven states carrying a
primary revenue deficit in FY02. Three of these have consistently run
primary revenue deficits in the four years since FY99: West Bengal,
Gujarat and Kerala (box 2). Debt to the NSSF, which came into
existence only in 1999, has risen in just two years (the debt composition
data stop at FY01) to as much as 19 - 21 percent of the total debt stock
in West Bengal and Gujarat.
xxxi Thus, it is the automaticity of loans
against small savings collections that has been the principal enabler of
fiscal profligacy in these states. Kerala is a somewhat different case,
where the state has collected large sums in special contractual savings
provident fund schemes, with high interest rates, in what is a within-state
version of small savings.
Given the history of loans against small saving collections, freely
available to states outside national government control under Article 293,
limited only by jurisdictional collection, it may not immediately be
possible to alter the jurisdictional nature of entitlements. What can be
done however, is to mandate that a certain portion, half or more, be
loaned to states but earmarked for retention in two funds recently
established, details on which are given below. This will simultaneously31
provide a bulwark against default while at the same time not enabling
current primary deficits.








FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY01
West Bengal 1906 5118 2332 1238 19
Gujarat 601 809 3171 2525 21
Kerala 584 1672 889 117 4
All states 7769 8625 1866 (-)5246 12
Notes:     Debt stock as at end-FY01. Actuals for later years were not available.
Source:   Reserve Bank of India.
There remains the problem of the inherited debt stock and
interest bill from the high interest rate days.  Under a new debt swap
mutually agreed to between the Central and state Governments, all state
loans from the Centre bearing coupons in excess of 13 percent would be
swapped with market borrowings and small savings loans at present
interest rates over a period of three years ending in FY05. In FY03, 25
states (excluding Maharashtra, Sikkim and West Bengal) prepaid high
cost debt from Centre, partly out of small savings collections and partly
through fresh market borrowings. The scheme has been continued in
FY04.
Another reform initiative is the setting up of two contingency
funds in FY99, outside the general revenues of state governments.  The
Consolidated Sinking Fund (CSF) is for redemption liabilities on account
of market borrowings. State Governments contribute a minimum of 1 to 3
percent of the outstanding market loans each year to the Fund, with no
ceiling. The Guarantee Redemption Fund (GRF) as the name suggests
is a contingency fund against default on loans guaranteed by state
governments, funded from earmarked guarantee fees. The accretions to
the Fund are invested in securities of the Central Government. So far 11
states have set up a CSF and three have set up a GRF.32
VI.  Conclusion
Buoyant growth in India is essential for fiscal reform to be
possible, and in turn requires that the kinds of physical and social
infrastructure that can only be publicly funded should go up in both
quantity and quality. Growth prospects in FY04 are good, on the back of
a good agricultural year, but future prospects hinge critically on fiscal
room for growth-promoting capital and current expenditure.
Compression of the fiscal deficit in the first half of the nineties
was pushed through in the face of a decline in revenue from trade taxes
which remains uncompensated.  The tax/GDP ratio had fallen by two
percentage points by FY02 relative to the pre-reform peak of 16 percent
of GDP. The trade tax reform itself was growth-enhancing. The decline in
public expenditure, which was achieved through compression of capital
expenditure, by as much as 4 percent of GDP over 1991-97, was not.
The joint welfare and growth outcomes of such reform processes remain
unexplored in the theoretical literature.
There are two strands to the fiscal imbalance path in India.
Interest rates on public debt started rising sharply in the eighties to a
peak average of 10.68 percent in FY00, after many decades of financial
suppression.  The paper details the political economy pressures that
fueled this rise.   Although interest rates have started declining after the
re-routing of small savings that began in FY00, the interest bill is still over
6 percent of GDP. At state government level, where the interest bill pre-
empts around 40 percent of own revenue collections, a debt swap
provision begun in FY03 will provide some relief.
The other strand is the path of interest-excluded primary fiscal
indicators. These worsened sharply in FY98, with the real wage hike
introduced that year for government employees and pensioners which
raised the consolidated salary bill by 1.5 percent of GDP. The paper
investigates whether this event was endogenous to the political economy
forces at work in the system.
The econometric exercise is performed for the consolidated
imbalance across all levels of government over the fifty-year period
1951-2001.  The regression equations show an election year response,33
which has become more marked in the last thirty years, with an upward
spike measured in first differences of 0.7 percent of GDP in the primary
revenue deficit, and 0.8 - 0.9 percent of GDP in the primary fiscal deficit.
There is also a countercyclical policy response, of  (-)0.04 percent of
GDP for every 1 percent of agricultural growth lagged by one year, and
between (-)0.06 and (-)0.09 percent for every 1 percent in overall growth,
also lagged by one year. There is no response to variations in the
concurrent growth rate, either overall, or agricultural, an expected result.
Two major fiscal reforms were initiated in FY00. One was the
accounting change with respect to small savings already alluded to. This
was a major fiscal achievement, carrying as it did both a fiscal dividend
and a growth dividend. But it remains incomplete.
Deposit rates on small savings are now benchmarked to an
assortment of instrument-specific benchmarks, with margins capped at
+50 basis points. Because these are zero-risk instruments, many still
carrying tax incentives, small savings rates constitute a floor to the
interest rate structure in the economy, and flows into small savings
continue to remain very buoyant at the positive margins currently
prevalent. The automaticity of this channel, beyond the reach of Central
control, unfortunately continues to remain an enabler of fiscal indiscipline
at state level.
Given the history of small saving collections, freely available to
states outside national government control over state borrowing under
Article 293, it may not immediately be possible to alter the jurisdictional
nature of entitlements. What can be done however, is to mandate that a
certain portion, half or more, be loaned to states but earmarked for
retention in the newly-created Consolidated Sinking Fund (CSF) or the
Guarantee Redemption Fund (GRF). This will simultaneously provide a
bulwark against default while at the same time not enabling current
primary deficits.
The second fiscal reform initiated in FY00 is fiscal responsibility
legislation. This has been recently enacted by the Centre and four states.
The single most effective feature in the fiscal legislation is the inflexible
annual limit on government guarantees to parastatal debt. No
simulations were possible for the Central Act, whose targets have been
delegated to Rules which are yet to be made public. The simulated
outcomes for the state Acts with revenue growing at historical rates of34
increase show permissible annual rates of increase in non-interest
revenue expenditure at between 0-5 percent. Quite aside from the
feasibility of such sharp cuts, there is the issue of how they will be
achieved. If staff prove to be more resistant to cuts than maintenance
and other expenditure, there could be a very steep decline in the quality
of government service, and infrastructure. Some infrastructure might
simply become inoperable without adequate maintenance. In conjunction
with the absence of path limits in the design of the Acts (with a few
exceptions), and the absence of any stated penalties for not
systematically moving towards the stipulated targets, the legislation is in
danger of becoming ineffective because the compression it calls for is so
extreme.
There is some sensitivity of non-interest revenue expenditure to
the average interest rate on government debt, typically well under one
percent for a one percent drop in the rate. Further prospects for
expenditure reform beyond the interest rate reform already achieved are
limited. The government work force is not high by international
standards, but is heavily skewed towards lower skill levels in
composition. The kind of selective downsizing this calls for is unlikely to
be politically feasible.
But the sensitivity to an improvement in revenue parameters is
far greater.  An increase in the buoyancy of total revenue (own plus
receipts from the Centre) to one yields an increase in the annual
permissible rate of increase in non-interest revenue expenditure of well
over one percent.  This reiterates once again that growth-facilitating
fiscal reform in India simply cannot take place without urgent attention to
raising tax revenues at all levels of government.35
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Endnotes
                                                       
i Audited actuals for FY99, FY00 and  FY01 were at 9.0, 9.5 and 9.1 percent respectively, and the
most updated approximations for FY02 and FY03 stand at 9.9 and 9.3 percent respectively.
ii Recent statements are in Srinivasan, 2002 and Reynolds, 2001.  For a summary of the literature
critical of excessive focus on fiscal imbalances, see Reddy, 2003.
iii See Goldman Sachs, 2003, for an especially optimistic projection.
iv The Central components of these estimates are either actuals (FY02) or revised budget
estimates (FY03); the state components are the most updated budget estimates possible for both
years.
v Alesina et al, 1997 carries an excellent summary of both opportunistic (uniform regardless of
party in power) and partisan (influenced by the ideology of the party in power) models, both
before and after the rational expectations revolution. The same source summarises the empirical
evidence for the OECD countries.
vi Combining actuals for the Centre with pre-actual revised estimates for States.
vii Lahiri, 2004, goes back to the eighties, and Reynolds, 2001 to the sixties, but neither has any
formal empirics.
viii Pre-actuals subject to revision are available for states for FY02, but the consolidated figure is
reported only after availability of actuals at both levels of government. The series obtained here
corrects some errors in an earlier such series (Rangamannar, 2002), which were the figures used
in Lahiri, 2004. Care has been taken to check that capital expenditures net out loan recoveries,
and loan repayments. The fiscal deficit as estimated here is larger than that officially reported for
the period after FY89.  The official figures have been used here even so, but raise troubling
doubts about the accuracy of official reporting of the consolidated fiscal deficit. Issues concerning
all aspects of fiscal transparency in India are examined in Rajaraman, 2001.
ix The reduction in fiscal deficits at the Centre starting FY00, is a pure outcome of the accounting
change.  This is the reason for the apparent improvement in Central fiscal deficits in the derived
series in Rangarajan and Srivastava, 2003.
x For the Centre; there is no readily available figure for consolidated receipts from disinvestment
by states.
xi Under the 1934 RBI Act, against the collateral of project assets, and subject to a cap specified
at some percentage of the annual rateable value of property (the principal tax base of local
authorities). Until 1998, these borrowings were for the most part from either the State government
(which would enter into the consolidated fiscal deficit at Central and State levels).
xii Tax-smoothing (Barro, 1979) is not so much the analogue as the mirror-image for public
consumption of the consumption-smoothing model for private consumption; what is smoothed
here is revenue (income) rather than expenditure (consumption).
xiii Under Article 293 of the Constitution, this is required only for states indebted to the Centre,
which in practice is the case for all states; see Hemming et al, 1997.
xiv Typically, these pressures were handled not by increasing the interest rate on a pre-existing
scheme, but by issuing a new instrument with a different configuration of rates and tax incentives.
xv   General elections to the national Parliament, if held before the fifth year of the full term, have
always been precipitated by the opposition rather than by the government in power voluntarily
choosing to shorten its term. Thus, general elections held after the lapse of less than five years
remain exogenously imposed, and are not jointly determined with the growth variables. This does
not hold at state government level (Khemani, 2004).
xvi  The states component in the aggregate is the pre-actual figure (the revised budget estimate).
xvii Ebrill et al, 1999 estimate that the cut-off tariff rate below which revenue will fall with further
liberalisation is 20 percent; Khattry and Rao, 2002, estimate it at 40 percent. The former
constructs an arithmetic example to illustrate the ease of finding compensating revenue, which
carries improbable macroeconomic parameters.40
                                                                                                                           
xviii In some years, the fall in tax revenue exceeded the fall in customs revenue, because there
was a related decline in Central excise on domestic manufacturing. A process of trade tariff
reductions requires corresponding reductions in excise levy rates on domestic production
(notwithstanding the countervailing excise duty that is levied on imports after levy of the basic
import tariff).
xix Even if revenue was not the immediate motivation for its introduction, a VAT should still be
expected to raise tax/GDP through the static efficiency gain from non-cascading taxation,
assuming public expenditure is a normal good with income elasticity greater than one. The static
efficiency gain has been estimated to exist through computable general equilibrium models
calibrated to particular economies. There is also a possible dynamic growth gain from the
reduced cost of capital resulting from set-offs on taxes on capital goods, where the VAT is so
structured; these remain unestimated. Other reinforcing considerations are the possible
information externalities from the VAT, in terms of compliance-enhancing effects on other taxes,
which could lead to higher tax/GDP ratios overall.
xx See also Mukhopadhyay 2003, who recommends a combination of a Central VAT starting with
excise at the production stage, in combination with a retail sales tax with uniform rates in all
states, along with removal of the CST on inter-state transactions.
xxi Because these sectors are underestimated even in the national accounts, the percentage of
true GDP lost would be even greater. There is also a hard-to-tax component of manufacturing
accounting for 5.5 percent of GDP.
xxii Support for fiscal legislation of this kind is not universal; (see Stiglitz, 2002: 106).
xxiii Imposed, or as in the Central Act, provided for.
xxiv Whether this is explicitly stated in the legislation (as for Tamil Nadu) or not.  The Kerala
correction officially begins in FY04, but in the absence of data for the base year FY03, it was
treated on par with the other states.
xxv Tax elasticity estimates in India are beset by a number of data and methodological problems,
although a new methodology proposed in Sen, 2002, may yield more reliable estimates in the
future.
xxviUnder Article 293 to the Constitution.  A particular twist in India however is that such control is
only applicable to state governments with outstanding debt to the Centre. See Hemming et. al.,
1997 for an excellent summary of the federal arrangements in India, and Ter-Minassian, 1997 for
comparative information on other federations.
xxvii The original intent of the Postal Savings Account introduced in 1882 was to enable collection
of savings from the population beyond the reach of banks into a nationally-available financial
pool.
xxviii They were at this level until 1 January 1999.
xxix There is also other evidence that state government borrowing within the Article 293 limits,
were undertaken from other non-concessional institutional windows, like the Rural Infrastructure
Development Fund, perhaps because of the greater procedural ease of these channels; see
Rajaraman, 2003a.
xxx In addition to deposits and redemptions (always shown in the Public Account), all investments
with deposits, all recoveries against those investments, all interest receipts and payments, and all
agency charges are now shown in the Public Account.
xxxi Prior to the NSSF, debt against small savings collections was merged with debt owed to the
Central government.